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
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
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San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service/Maritime Community Interrelationship

AD A 126628

J. Harry Hill

Transportation Systems Center
Cambridge MA 02142

March 1983
Final Report

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<p>16. Abstract:</p> <p>This project, an evaluation of the interrelationship between the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (SFVTS) and the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area, is the third in a series of evaluations from the point of view of the users of the VTSSs. The previous two ^{three} evaluations, one on the Puget Sound VTS (1) and the other on the Houston-Galveston VTS (2), were conducted under the sponsorship of the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Research and Development. This project was conducted under the sponsorship of the Vessel Traffic Service Branch of the Waterways Management Division, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems.</p> <p>The objectives of this project are to examine the interrelationship between the (SFVTS) and the Bay Area maritime community (BAMC) and to offer recommendations for the future of the SFVTS and its operation.</p> <p>This evaluation of the interrelationship between the SFVTS and the BAMC is based on a total of 59 face-to-face structured interviews and discussions with key members of the BAMC and immediate users of the SFVTS. The results of these interviews and discussions are presented in tabular and narrative forms, respectively, in Sections 3 and 4. Seven conclusions and recommendations are made on the basis of the findings</p>					
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PREFACE

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of the relationship between the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (SFVTS) and the maritime community which it serves. The resulting conclusions and recommendations offered are based on on-site interviews and discussions with key members of the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area, immediate users of the SFVTS and the management of other interested organizations.

The author wishes to express his appreciation to all the individuals interviewed and with whom the project was discussed. Particular appreciation is due to CMDR Alvin Cattalini, Commanding Officer of the SFVTS, and his staff and to Captain Carl M. Larkin, Marine Superintendent, American President Lines, Ltd., who so willingly gave of their wisdom, knowledge, and time during the course of this project.

The Independent Journal (San Rafael), San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco Examiner, San Jose Mercury, and San Francisco Progress very kindly granted permission to reproduce a number of their commentaries pertaining to the San Francisco Traffic Vessel Service. The Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Bay Region also very kindly granted permission to reproduce their charts of the Golden Gate Port Facilities.

The author also gratefully acknowledges the guidance and contributions to this study by LTJG J.R. Yacobi, G-WMM-1, the program manager.



ACCOMPLISHED
 THIS 10th DAY OF
 FEBRUARY 1968
 AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 I have hereunto set my hand
 and the seal of the
 State of New York
 this 10th day of February 1968.

[Signature]

[Seal]

A

METRIC CONVERSION FACTORS

Approximate Conversions to Metric Measures

Symbol	What You Know	Multiply by	To Find	Symbol
LENGTH				
in	inches	2.5	centimeters	cm
ft	feet	30	centimeters	cm
yd	yards	0.9	meters	m
mi	miles	1.6	kilometers	km
AREA				
sq in	square inches	6.5	square centimeters	cm ²
sq ft	square feet	0.09	square meters	m ²
sq yd	square yards	0.8	square meters	m ²
sq mi	square miles	2.6	square kilometers	km ²
acres	acres	0.4	hectares	ha
MASS (weight)				
oz	ounces	28	grams	g
lb	pounds	0.45	kilograms	kg
	short tons (2000 lb)	0.9	tonnes	t
VOLUME				
teaspoon	teaspoons	5	milliliters	ml
fl oz	tablespoons	15	milliliters	ml
c	fluid ounces	30	milliliters	ml
pt	cups	0.24	liters	l
qt	pints	0.47	liters	l
gal	quarts	0.96	liters	l
ft ³	gallons	3.8	liters	l
yd ³	cubic feet	0.03	cubic meters	m ³
	cubic yards	0.76	cubic meters	m ³
TEMPERATURE (exact)				
°F	Fahrenheit temperature	5/9 (after subtracting 32)	Celsius temperature	°C

* 1 in = 2.54 exactly. For other exact conversions and more detailed tables, see NBS Spec. Publ. 286, Units of Length and Measures, Price \$2.25, SD Catalog No. C13.10-286.

Approximate Conversions from Metric Measures

Symbol	When You Know	Multiply by	To Find	Symbol
LENGTH				
mm	millimeters	0.04	inches	in
cm	centimeters	0.4	inches	in
m	meters	3.3	feet	ft
km	kilometers	1.1	yards	yd
		0.6	miles	mi
AREA				
cm ²	square centimeters	0.16	square inches	in ²
m ²	square meters	1.2	square yards	yd ²
km ²	square kilometers	0.4	square miles	mi ²
ha	hectares (10,000 m ²)	2.5	acres	acres
MASS (weight)				
g	grams	0.035	ounces	oz
kg	kilograms	2.2	pounds	lb
t	tonnes (1000 kg)	1.1	short tons	short tons
VOLUME				
ml	milliliters	0.03	fluid ounces	fl oz
l	liters	2.1	pints	pt
		1.06	quarts	qt
m ³	cubic meters	0.26	gallons	gal
		37	cubic feet	ft ³
		1.3	cubic yards	yd ³
TEMPERATURE (exact)				
°C	Celsius temperature	9/5 (then add 32)	Fahrenheit temperature	°F




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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project, an evaluation of the interrelationship between the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (SFVTS) and maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area, is the third in a series of evaluations from the point of view of the users of the VTSS. The previous two evaluations, one on the Pudget Sound VTS (1) and the other on the Houston-Gavlestone VTS (2), were conducted under the sponsorship of the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Research and Development. This project was conducted under the sponsorship of the Vessel Traffic Service Branch of the Waterways Management Division, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems.

The objectives of this project are to examine the interrelationship between the (SFVTS) and the Bay Area maritime community (BAMC) and to offer recommendations for the future of the SFVTS and its operation.

This evaluation of the interrelationship between the SFVTS and the BAMC is based on a total of 59 face-to-face structured interviews and discussions with key members of the BAMC and immediate users of the SFVTS. The results of these interviews and discussions are presented in tabular and narrative forms, respectively, in which Sections 3 and 4 of this report. The following Conclusions and Recommendations are based on these findings.

1. Although not selected on any scientific or even systematic basis, the individuals interviewed or with whom discussions were held are believed to be representative of the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay Area.
2. The maritime community, in general, believes that the SFVTS is being operated as efficiently and as effectively as possible. More importantly, the maritime community, in particular, and the population of the region, in general, desire that the SFVTS be allowed to continue to operate as it

has in the past. It is recommended, however, that some means be found for extending the tours of duty for the controllers.

3. The concept of "Fee for Service" is considered to be not only unworkable but also unjustifiable. A workable method of fee collection on a "fair share" basis is unattainable. The services rendered by the SFVTS extend far beyond the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay Region. The only reason for the existence of the Government is to provide necessary services to its citizens that the citizens cannot, should not, or will not provide for themselves, and it is concluded that the SFVTS is such a service. It is recommended that the Government continue to provide the SFVTS through the United States Coast Guard.
4. In the event of the abolition of the SFVTS, there will be a negative response of considerable magnitude by the maritime community and the general public of the region of the San Francisco Bay against the institutions and individuals believed responsible.
5. The SFVTS makes a significant contribution to vessel safety and traffic facilitation in the San Francisco Bay area and its adjoining waterways and ports.
6. The SFVTS is at present making a very meaningful contribution to our national security through the monitoring of traffic of the military services and Special Interest Vessels. In the event of a national emergency, the SFVTS will be absolutely necessary to ensure the highest possible level of monitoring vessel traffic, vessel safety, and traffic facilitation.
7. On the basis of the results and conclusions of this study, it is recommended without qualification that the SFVTS continue to be operated, operated by the USCG, and upgraded by the modernization of its equipment and facilities.

1. INTRODUCTION

This project, an evaluation of the interrelationship between the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (SFVTS) and maritime community of the San Francisco Bay Area, is the third in a series of evaluations from the point of view of the users of VTSS. The previous two evaluations, one on the Puget Sound VTS (1) and the other on Houston-Galveston VTS (2), were conducted under the sponsorship of the U.S. Coast Guard Office of Research and Development. This evaluation of the SFVTS was conducted under the sponsorship of the Vessel Traffic Services Branch of the Waterways Management Division, U.S. Coast Guard Office of Marine Environment and Systems.

This evaluation of the interrelationship between the SFVTS and the Bay Area maritime community (BAMC) is based on a series of face-to-face structured interviews and discussions with key members of the BAMC and immediate users of the SFVTS. Guidelines for these interviews can be found in Appendix A. Although quantitative data and explicitly stated attitudes and opinions of the interviewees were collected, the conclusions and recommendations made are also based on impressions gained while conducting individual interviews and discussions and on the aggregation of the results as a whole.

The scope of the project did not allow for a scientific selection of a representative sample of the members of the BAMC; the individuals interviewed depended initially on the recommendations of CMDR Alvin Cattalini, Commanding Officer U.S. Coast Guard San Francisco Vessel Traffic Center and Captain Carl M. Larkin, Chairman of the Harbor Safety Committee of the Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Bay Region. The individuals first interviewed made further recommendations as to other individuals to interview. The names of all individuals interviewed are listed in Appendix B; however, the source of a specific datum, opinion or attitude is not cited except in cases where specific permission to quote was obtained and to do so is considered particularly pertinent.

1.1 OBJECTIVE

The objectives of this project are to examine the interrelationship between the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service (SFVTS) and the Bay Area maritime community (BAMC) and to offer recommendations for the future of the SFVTS and its operation.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the San Francisco Bay Region. The SFVTS was originally established as an experimental unit by the United States Coast Guard (CG) in 1968. That first system, called the Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR), consisted effectively of only a radar system which covered the area from the precautionary area beyond the approach buoy "SF" for the port of San Francisco to the northern and southern ends of San Francisco Bay, proper. The HAR monitored VHF-FM Channel 18A, but monitoring by vessels was and still is voluntary with respect to SFVTS. Following the occurrence of the collision of the two Standard Oil tankers, the SS Oregon Standard and the SS Arizona Standard on 18 January 1971 as "the HAR radar observer helplessly watched, "(3,p.201) federal legislation (4,5) was passed which drastically changed the mode of operation of the SFVTS. During the time of its operation the SFVTS has continued to improve its operating procedures (6,7,8). Of particular note are the procedures used to ensure that a target on the radar screens can be correlated with a specific vessel.

Each of the ports in which the CG operates and maintains a VTS has its own special environmental and physical hazards. These hazards constituted the basis for the initial establishment of the VTS and for its continued existence. The San Francisco Bay area is significant in the continuing threat of fast currents, heavy fog and areas of shallow water. Cross currents as well as fast currents are a normal occurrence in the region of the San Francisco Bay. There were only two months in the year 1982 when the peak current through the Golden Gate was less than five knots (4.7 and 4.9 knots), and there were three months when the peak current was six knots or more (6.0, 6.0, and 6.1

CHART 1

GOLDEN GATE PORT FACILITIES




CHART 2

GOLDEN GATE PORT FACILITIES











CHART 3



SAN FRANCISCO BAY



SAN FRANCISCO BAY

knots). With such currents, the speed over the ground of major vessels going to sea might have to be as much as 14 knots or more to maintain steerageway. According to the pilots interviewed, the velocity requirement with respect to the water can vary between two and eight knots with an average of about four knots depending on the responsiveness of the vessel. In addition to the velocity of the current, its direction relative to the traffic lane can require a rudder angle of as much as ten degrees. It is not uncommon for vessels traversing the area between the San Francisco Bar Channel and the Golden Gate to drift outside the boundaries of the traffic lanes as designated by the traffic separation scheme (TSS).

Only rarely do severe environmental conditions require the closing of the San Francisco Bar Channel; however, because of high seas the area from outside the Bar Channel to the Golden Gate did have to be closed to all traffic by the Captain of the Port on 23 December 1982 from 1500 to 2400 hours and again on 26 January 1983 from 1630 to 1930 hours. During these storms many of the vessels at anchorages in the Bay dragged their anchors. Only by the constant watch of the SFVTS were these vessels able to be informed of their situations so they could take corrective actions.

The primary environmental problem for the entire San Francisco Bay Region is fog. The area from the Precautionary Area outside the Bar through the Golden Gate to Alcatraz Island is often entirely covered with fog. Other areas particularly subject to fog are the waterways leading to the Ports of Stockton and Sacramento; however, low visibility due to patches of fog is not uncommon anywhere in the Bay Area. The traffic in the inland waterways, rivers and shipcanals must be coordinated not only in the case of fog but also because there are a number of reaches too narrow for the TSS. These reaches are restricted to one way traffic when vessels carrying explosives and other dangerous cargo are in transit.

Even under conditions of high visibility there are a number of "blind corners" in the waterways of the San Francisco Bay area. These corners not only prevent the masters and pilots from seeing any opposing traffic around the corner, but the high ground forming some of the corners also stops radio

transmission. Under these conditions, passing arrangements are made through the radio facilities of the SFVTS. Similarly, the radio facilities of the SFVTS are often used to make passing arrangements and to coordinate traffic whenever the transceivers used by the pilots for bridge-to-bridge communication do not have sufficient range for the distances involved. Such conditions often exist between traffic entering and traffic leaving the waterways between the ports of Sacramento or Stockton and San Francisco Bay.

In clear weather, since all pilots check in with the SFVTS as they board at sea, in the bay, or at the dock, bridge-to-bridge communication is not always used between pilots of vessels transitting the traffic lanes from sea to the Gate. The pilots are aware of the traffic in this area by monitoring Channel 13. Inbound vessels are normally piloted by Bar Pilots between the pilot-boarding-area outside the San Francisco Bar to the eastern side of Alcatraz Island and by Inland Pilots from Alcatraz Island to the dock or anchorage. This procedure is reversed outbound; however, Bar Pilots may take vessels from the dock or anchorage in the Bay out to sea or the reverse. In addition, submarines are often piloted by selected Bar Pilots between the submarine base at Mare Island and sea. There are, however, negotiations presently underway to combine the two associations of pilots which should reduce the need to change pilots. A vessel going to or from Sacramento or Stockton would still require a pilot specifically qualified and licensed for these ports. The Navy has pilots (civil service) who pilot all types of naval vessels as their time permits.

All major vessels, commercial and tanker, except those with drafts of 40 feet or more, are expected to abide by the TSS. The vessels with drafts of 40 feet or more must go north of Harding Rock, north around Alcatraz Island, then south under the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to the deep water anchorage. This anchorage is located approximately at the intersection of a line due south from Yerba Buena Island and a line due west from Alameda. Here the deep draft vessels are either off-loaded completely or to a point at which their draft is shallow enough to enable them to go to the docks.

These deep draft vessels require special handling by the SFVTS, since they cannot be routed within the TSS, but must be routed inbound through the outbound traffic lane north of Alcatraz Island. Under these conditions, very specific passing arrangements must be made with any opposing traffic. Similarly traffic leaving the Port of San Francisco in the area south of Alcatraz Island, an area referred to as "The Front", often request to travel outbound via the inbound traffic lane rather than go east and north around Alcatraz and use the outbound traffic lane. The SFVTS normally recommends against such a request unless there are obvious safety related reasons for the request. For example, concurrence is usually given if there is heavy southbound traffic in the Precautionary Area east of Alcatraz Island or there is a regatta in the recreation area west of Angel Island, and the recreational boats have spilled over into the outbound traffic lane.

In addition to the numbers of commercial vessels, there are large numbers of recreational vessels both sail and power in the San Francisco Bay area. The environmental conditions virtually guarantee good sailing winds in the Bay just about everyday of the year. Although the SFVTS does not, should not, and certainly cannot track all these recreational vessels, it does its best to keep the commercial traffic aware of them, particularly regattas. Masters and pilots of commercial vessels consider the presence of recreational boats, particularly sail boats, in the traffic lanes to be extremely hazardous. They do not object to their presence in the Bay, but they believe that many of the recreational boaters lack the knowledge and experience to operate in mixed marine traffic. These professional mariners also associate excessive alcohol consumption with recreational boating. It should be pointed out, however, that the number of recreational boaters who use the services of the SFVTS is considerable. Recording of the use of the SFVTS by "non-Channel 13 vessels" was started in FY80. In the period from FY80 to FY82 the number of these vessel-trips handled by the SFVTS effectively doubled increasing from 1047 to 1898. These numbers do not include the recreational boaters who monitor Channel 13, but do not communicate with the SFVTS. Appendix C contains the tabulation of all traffic according to type of vessel handled by the SFVTS for FY79 and FY80.

The memory of the collision of the SS OREGON STANDARD and the SS ARIZONA STANDARD is still strong in minds of the general public of the San Francisco Bay Area as well as the members of the marine community. The results of the accident are summarized in the following excerpts from the Department of Transportation Marine Casualty Report (10).

Subsequent to the collision, the two vessels remained locked together and drifted on the flood tide under the bridge into the inner bay. Using one of the OREGON STANDARD's anchors, the vessels anchored off Point Knox, Angel Island. During the next 7 hours, numerous barges, tugs, oil booms, and various types of oil removal equipment arrived in the area and proceeded to off-load cargo and contain and clean up the spilled oil. Approximately 800,000 gallons of oil spilled from the OREGON STANDARD. No cargo was lost from the ARIZONA STANDARD. After sufficient off-loading had been accomplished to allow the vessels to free themselves, they proceeded to Long Wharf at Richmond.

The subsequent tides carried the oil several miles to sea. As the oil spread up and down the coastline, beaches became fouled as far south as Half Moon Bay (approximately 25 miles south of the Golden Gate Bridge) and as far north as Kellam Beach (approximately 20 miles north of the bridge). Hundreds of birds perished, despite extensive efforts to collect and clean them. It is estimated that only about 3.5 percent of the birds which were coated with oil survived. The damage, if any, to shellfish and other sea life has not been determined and may not be known for several years, if ever.

Standard Oil of California, many Federal, State, and local government agencies, and hundreds of volunteers coordinated their efforts to contain and clean up the oil spill

in an effort to minimize the environmental damages. It is estimated that Standard Oil of California spent over \$4,000,000 in efforts to reduce and rectify damages caused by the spill. (p.5)

Ecological losses which affect the general population, in addition to the economic losses incurred by the vessels' operators, resulted from this casualty. The results might have been even more catastrophic if two supertankers of more than 100,000 GT had been involved, or if the cargo of the OREGON STANDARD had been gasoline in lieu of bunker fuel.

These damages are suffered to a large extent by the third party or innocent bystander, which was the general public in this casualty. Potential losses which would follow casualties to large tankers would also impinge to a large degree on the general public. (p.17)

The San Francisco Bay area, although an extremely beautiful area and used extensively by all manner of marine vessels, can also be extremely hazardous to navigation of all types of marine traffic as described above. It is this combination of beauty, use, and danger that sparked the foundation of the "Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service" when it became known that consideration was being given to the abolition of the VTSs operated by the CG. The strength of this movement is indicated by the fact that well over \$100,000 was quickly raised to pay for the expenses of petitioning the Department of Transportation and the CG not to close the SFVTS. A roster of the organizations that are members of the Coalition can be found in Appendix D.

A number of the newspapers in the Bay area also came out in support of the Coalition to save the SFVTS. A sample of clippings from these newspapers can be found in the Appendix E. Whether or not it was a result of the efforts of the Coalition and the newspapers, the SFVTS was funded for FY83, so that it is still in operation.

The maritime industry, the maritime recreational organizations, the local chapters of national environmental organizations and local newspapers have all joined forces in support of the "Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service." The joining of forces by such organizations as the Chevron Shipping Company and the Sierra Club in support of the SFVTS effectively answers the question of the relationship between the maritime community and the SFVTS. The very existence of this Coalition and the effort it has made to prevent the abolition, in a sense, raises the question of the need for this study. The relationship between the BAMC and the SFVTS can be described in the main only as excellent. Members of the Coalition representing just about all aspects of the maritime community were extremely cooperative in the arrangements for interviews and in the provision of information sought for this study.

2. METHODOLOGY

The threat of closure of the SFVTS and the ensuing formation of the "Coalition To Save Vessel Traffic Service" influenced not only the data that were collected for the project but also the manner in which it was collected. The initial plan was to use the same procedures and to focus on the same data as had been collected for the two previous evaluation of VTSs (1,2). Guidelines for the interviews for this study were developed on this basis. These guidelines were modified briefings in San Francisco on the Coalition and the local maritime situation by the Commanding Officer of the SFVTS. Although the guidelines include a number of changes suggested by him, he bears no responsibility for their final form.

2.1 THE SAN FRANCISCO VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE

A total of four days was spent at the Traffic Service. During these four days, briefings were received on the nature of the maritime community, the geography of the San Francisco Bay Area, the overall operation of the SFVTS and the specific aspects of the system to which the watchstander has to pay particular attention. Armed with this background information, the data collection was made on the interrelationship between the SFVTS and the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area.

2.2 THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA MARITIME COMMUNITY (BAMC)

The BAMC, for purposes of this project, is defined to include all individuals and groups of individuals in the vicinity that would be adversely affected by a marine disaster - collision, grounding, or ramming - which might occur within the area served by the SFVTS. Specific interest groups within the maritime community were sought out for questioning and discussions about the present and future operation of the SFVTS. The specific interest groups identified fall into three categories: (1) key members of the maritime industry such as management personnel of a shipping firm or a marine organization, (2) key members of environmental groups such as the Oceanic Society or the Sierra Club, and (3) immediate users of the SFVTS such as masters and pilots of vessels who have direct interaction with the SFVTS.

2.3 SELECTION OF INDIVIDUALS FOR INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

The selection of the individuals for interviews and discussions about the SFVTS in any scientific or systematic manner was beyond the scope of this project. For this reason the aggregation of individuals from whom information for this project was obtained cannot be considered a sample representative of all members of the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area. There is no doubt, however, that the individuals selected are vitally interested in the maintenance and operation of the SFVTS, are immediate users of the SFVTS, or are extremely concerned with the protection of the San Francisco region from any pollution due to the collisions, groundings, and rammings of marine vessels. Furthermore, attempts to locate any individual known to be in favor of the unqualified abolition of the SFVTS were unsuccessful.

A meeting with three key members of the maritime community was arranged by the Commanding Officer of the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Center. These three individuals are key members of the management of major shipping firms and also key members of the Harbor Safety Committee of the Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Region. (The Marine Exchange is the local trade association for the marine industry of the San Francisco Bay area.) At this meeting arrangements were made to interview each of these three individuals as well as other key members of management in the maritime community. In addition, arrangements were made with these members of management to interview members of their organizations who are immediate users of the SFVTS. The positions, numbers, and experience, as appropriate, of individuals from whom information and data were obtained for this study are given in Tables 1 and 2.

The names and addresses of the local chapters of environmental organizations and the heads of organizations of recreational boating clubs were obtained from the executive director of the Coalition. No contacts were made with the fishing industry in the San Francisco region largely because the fishing industry is quite diverse and not organized in a readily accessible manner.

TABLE 1

POSITION OF KEY MEMBERS OF THE MARITIME COMMUNITY
OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION CONSULTED ON SFVTS

Position	Number
Member Management, Marine Corporation	11
Officer, Marine Industry Association	5
Executive, Environmental Organization	3
Officer, United States Navy	3
Officer, United States Coast Guard	7
Officer, Recreational Boating Organization	2
Total	<hr/> 31

TABLE 2

NUMBER AND EXPERIENCE OF IMMEDIATE USERS OF
SFVTS CONSULTED ON THE OPERATION OF THE SFVTC

Position	Number Interviewed	Years Experience	
		Median	Range
Master-Pilot, Tanker	3	32	6 to 35
Master, Container Ship	3	32	30 to 38
First Officer, Container Ship	1	28	28
Master, Ferry	6	9.5	8 to 17
Master, Tug	6	10	3 to 28
Pilot, Bar	5	16	10 to 24
Pilot, Inland and River	4	9	7 to 16
Pilot, United States Navy	1	26	26
Operator, Pilot Boat	1	6	6
Total	30		

2.4 DATA COLLECTION

All data and information for this study was collected by means of face-to-face structured interviews or through wide ranging discussions of the general topic of the interrelationship between the maritime community of the Bay area and the SFVTS. In most interview situations, the interview guidelines (See Appendix A) were used to direct the discussions. The guidelines were not used in discussions with members of the military services, environmental organizations, recreational boating organizations, or trade associations.

3. RESULTS

Information and data obtained from the structured interviews are presented in tabular form to the extent possible. Information obtained from questions which allowed open ended answers or led to discussions are presented in narrative form.

3.1 TABULATED DATA

The responses by key members and by immediate users to those items which could be qualified are presented in Tables 3 through 6.

3.2 OPEN-ENDED OR DISCUSSION ITEMS

The information and data obtained from the open-ended or discussion questions do not lend themselves to presentation in tabular form. This information and data are presented and discussed as each topic is taken up in the discussion section of this report.

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF YES/NO RESPONSES BY KEY MEMBERS OF THE
MARITIME COMMUNITY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION

ITEM	Number of Responses	Responses	
		Yes	No
1. Direct Experience with SFVTS.	14	4	10
2. Indirect Experience with SFVTS.	14	9	5
3. Visited SFVTS.	14	13	1
4. Do all your vessels participate in the SFVTS.	13	11	2
5. Should all vessels participate in the SFVTS.	13	11	2
6. Is the voluntary participation in SFVTS working.	12	12	—
7. Should the SFVTS be operated by an organization other than the USCG.	14	3	11
8. Should the SFVTS be "self supporting" by the collection of "fees for service".	13	9	4
9. Should the SFVTS be abolished.	14	—	14

TABLE 4

RATINGS ON A SCALE OF 1 to 7
GIVEN BY KEY MEMBERS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY AREA MARITIME COMMUNITY

ITEM	No. of Ratings	Rating on Scale 1-7	
		Median Rating	Range
1. The contribution that the SFVTS makes to vessel safety.	14	6	1 to 7
2. The contribution that the SFVTS makes to traffic facilitation.	13	5.5	3 to 7

TABLE 5

RESPONSES BY IMMEDIATE USERS OF THE SFVTS

ITEM	Response	
1. Experience as pilot, master, and/or ships officer.	Median	15.5 years
	Range	1-40 years
2. Frequency of participation in SFVTS.	Daily	21 Users
	Weekly	3 Users
	Monthly	4 Users
3. Experience at other ports.	Yes	7 Users
	No	21 Users
4. Experience with other VTS.	Yes	13 Users
	No	15 Users
5. Visit VTS.	Yes	20 Users
	No	8 Users
6. Are you satisfied with the current SFVTS.	Yes	26 Users
	No	2 Users
7. Should the SFVTS be a mandatory system.	Yes	12 Users
	No	16 Users
8. Should the SFVTS be operated by an organization other than the USCG.	Yes	6 Users
	No	20 Users
	Don't know	2 Users
9. Should the SFVTS be abolished.	Yes	2 Users*
	No	26 Users

*Qualified "No" responses. See text for qualifications.

TABLE 6
RATINGS ON A SCALE OF 1 to 7
GIVEN BY IMMEDIATE USERS
OF THE SFVTS

ITEM	No. of Ratings	Rating on Scale 1-7	
		Median Rating	Range
1. The information provided in the SFVTS advisories.	28	6	5.5 to 4.7
2. The way the SFVTS provides advisories.	28	7	5.5 to 7
3. The way the SFVTS manages traffic.	28	6.5	5 to 7
4. SFVTS watchstander competence.	28	7	5 to 7
5. How well the SFVTS is working.	28	7	6 to 7
6. The contribution by SFVTS to vessel safety.	28	7	4 to 7
7. The contribution by SFVTS to traffic facilitation.	28	6.5	5 to 7

4. DISCUSSION

Each topic covered in the interviews and discussion with both key members of the San Francisco Bay Region and the immediate users of the SFVTS will be discussed in turn. The tabulated data and that received in narrative form from open-ended questions and during discussions will be integrated in the conclusions and recommendations resulting from this effort.

4.1 EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

Each of the key members of the San Francisco Bay area with whom the SFVTS was discussed was empowered to speak for his organization. These individuals all had very strong opinions of what the abolition of the SFVTS would mean to the local maritime community. The points of view of these individuals will be brought out as appropriate in this discussion.

The immediate users of the SFVTS have an overall median length of experience in maritime service of 15.5 years with a range of experience of from 6 to 40 years. How representative each category of immediate user might be can be judged from the experience data presented in Table 2.

4.2 EVALUATION OF SFVTS OPERATION

There is no doubt that the SFVTS is doing an excellent job. This conclusion is based on the responses by the immediate users of the system to the Item "How well the SFVTS is working." (See Table 6, Item 5.) The SFVTS watchstanders are considered professional and courteous as controllers and present clearly and completely the information used by the pilots and masters. Whenever there was a negative opinion of SFVTS watchstanders offered, it was always associated with the "problem of the inexperienced watchstander" and comments on the requirement of the CG to rotate personnel, "I can always tell when there is a new watchstander." These new watchstanders were described by a small number of users as "too rigid... they operate too much by the book... (and) they don't know enough about our job." Intolerance for the watchstanders with little experience occurred primarily among users who had

never visited the SFVTS. Those who had visited the SFVTS discounted the performance of watchstanders during their training. These users were well aware that an experienced watchstander or watchofficer was standing right behind the trainee.

The principle of operation of the SFVTS was never questioned by any individual who was formally questioned or with whom there was an opportunity to explore the topic in full. One pilot with whom it was possible to have only a short conversation was quite negative toward the SFVTS. This attitude appeared to be based on his desire to be seen as "perfect" in his work and the fear that he might make a minor error, such as, being temporarily unreachable on his radio by the SFVTS because he was using another channel to communicate with his tug. Further, the fact that his work was, in effect, being monitored troubled him. His reputation among the other pilots is impeccable.

The primary function most often singled out for positive comment is that the SFVTS keeps everyone informed of all traffic. In fact, there were a few complaints of "they tell me about traffic that is miles away that I'll never come anywhere near" and "they put out too much information." Such comments were often followed by the remark that this situation only occurred with relatively inexperienced watchstanders. Some users complained about the non-VTS use of Channel 13 by recreational boaters, but they added that the watchstanders soon "shut them up."

Some of the users were critical of the SFVTS for refusing to allow them to deviate at will from the TSS. On the other hand, the depth of the water requires that inbound deep draft vessels, those with drafts of 40 feet or more, must deviate from the TSS. The deep water routing of these vessel requires that they use the outbound trafficway north of Harding Rock and Alcatraz Island where they might meet opposing traffic (See Charts 3,4). Some users do not appear to realize that the CG is empowered by legislation (4,5) to enforce the TSS and bridge-to-bridge communication as required for reasons of vessel safety, and the strictness of the CG in these two areas is not understood. The SFVTS is often helpful in establishing bridge-to-bridge communication. Once

contact between two vessels has been established via the SFVTS, the two vessels often find that they can communicate directly with each other. In the main, the inability to establish bridge-to-bridge communication due to high ground or long distances between the vessels. Such radio communications are often impossible for inland and river traffic where some of the reaches are quite narrow and visibility can change very rapidly. It is concluded that traffic management by the SFVTS is imperative under these conditions.

Most of the immediate users referred to the SFVTS as an excellent "aid to navigation" which would be sorely missed if abolished. On the other hand, there was complete agreement among these users that the operation of the SFVTS was not an absolute necessity. It must be pointed out that these users gave the impression that they feared they would be judged incompetent if they stated that the SFVTS was essential in order to maintain the present level of vessel safety and traffic facilitation. A similar sentiment was expressed by some of the key members of the maritime community. Traffic would flow without the SFVTS, but the masters and pilots would have to be more careful, particularly under conditions of low visibility.

Probably the best testament to the excellence in operation of the SFVTS is that the "Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service" was organized as soon as it became known publically that the SFVTS was threatened with abolition. With respect to the SFVTS facility per se, the opinion was expressed by members of both groups, key members and immediate users, that the equipment at the Traffic Center should be updated. Specifically, it was recommended that the present radar equipment should be replaced by beacon radar which would allow the use of transponders. Further, digitized displays would ease the work of the watchstanders. Additionally, a few of the users lamented the demise of the photographic recording of the radar displays. These users considered such records as invaluable in the event of an incident for which blame would have to be affixed. The capability to record the radar displays should be taken into consideration in the planning for any updating of the equipment and facilities at the SFVTS.

One of the two immediate users who responded with a "yes" to the

question of abolition of the SFVTS added that it was a luxury, but would be missed if abolished. The other "yes" response to this question was a question of priorities. Since the closing of the SFVTS is considered a matter of funding, his opinion was that the funding of Search and Rescue (SAR) was more important than that of the SFVTS. Another user then pointed out that without the SFVTS there would be an even greater need for funds for SAR.

The SFVTS can be considered a link in SAR operations in the San Francisco Bay area. For example, a SAR incident occurred in the middle of October 1982 in which the SFVTS played a critical role. A vessel off the Golden Gate in extremely dense fog was sinking. The SFVTS controller was able to vector the rescuing helicopter to the scene with no resulting loss of life.

4.3 FEES FOR SERVICE SFVTS

The key members, with but a few exceptions, stated that the SFVTS could be "self supporting" by the collection of "fees for service". Those in support of this position are, on the whole major shippers whose vessels compose a minor portion of the traffic handled by the SFVTS. Corporations whose business require many intra-bay transits are either only partly supportive of this position or totally and vehemently against it, citing costs. Others merely dismissed the concept as totally unworkable and not worthy of consideration. The pilots see such a fee as an increase in cost to the traffic entering the port of San Francisco, and the additional costs would eventually reduce the traffic and therefore their livelihood. The Coalition, while presumably supporting the concept, appears to have come to the conclusion that the concept is unworkable due to the high operating and insurance costs and the difficulty of working out a system of equitable fees.

It was put forth in discussion by one key member that the only means by which the SFVTS could be supported would be by some general tax on the entire marine industry, such as a tax on marine fuel. The monies from this tax would then be used to support all "aids to navigation" including vessel traffic service for the entire country. On the basis of the information obtained in this

study almost any increase in the costs for the maritime industry would, in view of the present state of the economy, put many marine corporations out of business. Every member of management in the maritime community queried on the state of business responded that income was down anywhere from 30 to 50 percent.

The option that the SFVTS be taken over and operated on a fee-for-service basis by an organization other than an agency of the Government has also been discarded. Even though the primary purpose of the SFVTS is marine safety, the possibility of a marine incident with its associated liabilities would still exist. The costs of liability insurance for a non-Government VTS would have to be included in the fees. The several estimates of the insurance premiums obtained to date by the Coalition have been in the order of \$250,000 and more. The question of liability has been discussed in two documents (11,12) which indicate that any VTS can be held liable for a marine incident under the appropriate circumstances.

In addition to the problems of costs and liabilities there are two further reasons for the operation of the SFVTS to remain as is. The first is the "love-hate" relationship between the CG and maritime community and in particular the immediate users. The bottom line of this relationship is that the CG is the only organization that has the respect of the entire BAMC. The integrity of and respect for the CG is unquestioned, and the CG is the only organization with the authority and facilities necessary to ensure the highest possible level of vessel safety and traffic facilitation.

The second reason is not supported by the results of the interviews and discussions conducted during the course of this study, but rather it depends on general observations made during off-hours. San Francisco Bay area is a major tourist area enjoyed by people from all over the nation. How are all these individuals to be taxed for their pleasures of visiting the Bay Area? Further, are these individuals from all over the nation to be deprived of these pleasures because the abolition of the SFVTS resulted in a major marine incident which polluted or even possibly destroyed the area? For example, note the incident referred to in Appendix E, page E-2, as well as the collision of the SS

ARIZONA STANDARD and the SS OREGON STANDARD.

It can only be concluded from the results of this study that the SFVTS cannot and should not be self-supporting by the collection of fees for service to the maritime industry of the San Francisco Bay region.

4.4 RECREATIONAL BOATERS AND ENVIRONMENTALISTS

The recreational boaters and the environmentalists responded to the possibility of abolition of the SFVTS in the same way as the rest of the maritime community. This segment of the maritime community feels that "The SFVTS is required to protect our interests." For the recreational boater, the recreational boating areas must be protected from intrusions by major vessels and pollution resulting from spills of oil and other dangerous cargos. Similarly, the environmentalists see the loss of the SFVTS as opening up the possibility of another collision and oil spill equal to if not larger than that which occurred in 1971. It was also pointed out during discussions that, in the event of a marine incident, the oil distillate used as fuel by most modern vessels would result in a major oil spill, equally if not more harmful than that of an equal amount of bunker oil. Distillate is not as readily visible as bunker oil and cannot be as easily avoided by marine and other types of wildlife. Its presence would make an area equally as unusable by humans, marine life, and wildlife.

The officers of recreational boating and environmental organizations went to great length to point out the numbers of individuals who are dues paying members of their organizations, the numbers of individuals who are associated as family members and friends of these dues paying members and the numbers more who are involved in recreational boating and other outdoor activities associated with the waterways and shorelines in the San Francisco Bay region. The point was further made that if the SVTS is abolished, they would not blame the CG for the loss of protection of their recreational areas. A clear impression was received that these individuals would exact their retribution for the abolition of the SFVTS through the electoral process at the national level.

In addition to the many boaters and environmentalists, the general public of the San Francisco Bay area is constantly being reminded by the local news media of the fact that the economic well being of the area depends extensively on the traffic in the Bay. An example of the media coverage is the editorial appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle on 15 November 1982 (See Appendix E, page E11). In view of the present state of the economy, any action such as the abolition of the SFVTS could well be viewed by the general public as a threat to their economic well being and create feelings of animosity toward those they believe responsible.

The importance of our ports to the economy of the nation was acknowledged by the President in "The State of the Union", 25 January 1983, as reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 31 January 1983.

One out of every five jobs in our country depends on trade. So, I will propose a broader strategy in the field of international trade - one that increases the openness of our trading system and is fairer to America's farmers and workers in the world marketplace. We must have adequate export financing to sell American products overseas. I will ask for new negotiating authority to remove barriers and get more of our products into foreign markets. We must strengthen the organization of our trade agencies and make changes in our domestic laws and international trade policy to promote free trade and the increased flow of American goods, services and investments.

Our trade position can also be improved by making our port system more efficient. Better, more active harbors translate into stable jobs in our coal fields, railroads, trucking industry and ports. After two years of debate, it is time for us to get together and enact a port modernization bill. (p. 108)

Modernization of our ports will require not only such projects as dredging and building docks and cargo handling facilities, but will also require steps to ensure the safety of vessels and facilitation of traffic inbound, outbound, and within the ports. On the basis of this study, VTSs are one of the best means of fulfilling these vessel traffic requirements.

4.5 VESSEL SAFETY AND TRAFFIC FACILITATION

Some of the key members of the maritime community contended during discussions that the bridge-to-bridge radio communication coupled with the TSS would be sufficient to ensure vessel safety and traffic facilitation. This conclusion might be true if these regulations were followed without exception. How are deep draft vessels to be handled under these conditions? Would they be excluded from the Bay as too hazardous, since they cannot abide by the TSS, if they are to reach their anchorage? Furthermore, there is a sufficient number of requests for exceptions from the TSS that cannot be justified "for a safety related reason," to create doubt that the TSS would be abided with in the event of the abolition of the SFVTS.

There is no way to determine whether the TSS and the bridge-to-bridge regulations would be followed if the surveillance of the traffic by the SFVTS was not present. If the SFVTS did not monitor Channel 13 and maintain radar surveillance there is no doubt that vessel safety and traffic facilitation would suffer. Unfortunately, the degradation cannot be predicted from this study. The data does show, however, that most of the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay area believes that it would. It must be pointed out that much of the success of the SFVTS is due to cooperation of the members of the maritime community who participate voluntarily in the system.

4.6 SFVTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

There must be a SFVTS. If we did not have the SFVTS in the event of a national emergency, we would have to invent one. Any system we could come up with in a hurry in

the event of a national emergency could not possibly be as good as a system already in place and operating as well as this one does. The SFVTS is the single best aid to navigation in the Bay. That VTS is one of the better things that the CG does; it certainly reduces the SAR (search and rescue) requirements. It attacks the problem of vessel safety where all safety problems should be attacked —prevention. Your report should emphasize that the VTS is a preventive system. Any marine incident can be very disastrous. The loss of any vessel results in a fuel spill. Just about all vessels use distillate fuel now, and it is worse than bunker fuel. Bunker fuel can be seen and avoided, but distillate is practically invisible and will cause trouble for all organisms.

A self-supporting system with a fee collecting system? Collection difficulties would far outweigh the advantages. The SFVTS is working. All the Navy vessels participate in the system. It should be mandatory for all vessels. A public relations effort should be mounted for the support of the SFVTS.

The above is a paraphrase of some of the opinions expressed by Captain A.M. Osborne, Commanding Officer, Naval Station Treasure Island, during discussions concerning the present and future operation of SFVTS. One of his staff officers, CDR M.D. Seiders, JAG, was also present and contributed to the discussion.

All military officers, Navy and Coast Guard, active or reserve, with whom the problem of SFVTS and national security was discussed stated very emphatically that SFVTS would be critical to national security in the event of a national emergency. Contingency planning includes the presence and operation of the SFVTS.

The use of the SFVTS for purposes of national security does not need to

await the occurrence of a national emergency. The SFVTS is informed well in advance of the arrival of Special Interest Vessels (SIVs). These vessels are from or have crew members who are from nations which are considered to pose potential risks to our national security. The Office of the Captain of the Port notifies the VTS of the pending arrival of all SIVs. The activities of these vessels are monitored continually by the SFVTS.

As pointed out above and as shown by the traffic counts in Appendix C, Tables I through XIV, San Francisco Bay Area is now and is increasingly a major military port on the West Coast. No attempt was made to collect data beyond that of traffic counts provided by the SFVTS; however, it is reasonable to assume the presence of a full array of modern weapons stored in the area and onboard the Naval vessels Based at Alameda Naval Air Station and the submarine base at Mare Island. There are also the explosive laden vessel bound to or from the ammunition depot at Concord and other points in the area. Any incident, however slight, involving any of these vessels could bring forth a totally unwelcomed and unasked for public reaction. Such a reaction could have only an adverse effect on national security. The operation of the SFVTS certainly reduces the probability of the occurrence of such an incident.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Although not selected on any scientific or even systematic basis, the individuals interviewed or with whom discussions were held are believed to be representative of the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay Area.
2. The maritime community, in general, believes that the SFVTS is being operated as efficiently and as effectively as possible. More importantly, the maritime community, in particular, and the population of the region, in general, desire that the SFVTS be allowed to continue to operate as it has in the past. It is recommended, however, that some means be found for extending the tours of duty for the controllers.
3. The concept of "Fee for Service" is considered to be not only unworkable but also unjustifiable. A workable method of fee collection on a "fair share" basis is unattainable. The services rendered by the SFVTS extend far beyond the maritime community of the San Francisco Bay Region. The only reason for the existence of the Government is to provide necessary services to its citizens that the citizens cannot, should not, or will not provide for themselves, and it is concluded that the SFVTS is such a service. It is recommended that the Government continue to provide the SFVTS through the United States Coast Guard.
4. In the event of the abolition of the SFVTS, there will be a negative response of considerable magnitude by the maritime community and the general public of the region of the San Francisco Bay against the institutions and individuals believed responsible.
5. The SFVTS makes a significant contribution to vessel safety and traffic facilitation in the San Francisco Bay area and its adjoining waterways and ports.

6. The SFVTS is at present making a very meaningful contribution to our national security through the monitoring of traffic of the military services and Special Interest Vessels. In the event of a national emergency, the SFVTS will be absolutely necessary to ensure the highest possible level of vessel safety and traffic facilitation.
7. On the basis of the results and conclusions of this study, it is recommended without qualification that the SFVTS continue to be operated, operated by the USCG, and upgraded by the modernization of its equipment and facilities.

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Appendix A

Interview Guideline - San Francisco Bay Area

Key Member of the Maritime Community

A-2

Interview Guideline - San Francisco Bay Area

Immediate User of the SFVTS

A-3

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE - SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA

KEY MEMBER OF THE MARITIME COMMUNITY

- | | | |
|--|----------|---------------|
| 1. Name | Tel. No. | |
| 2. Position | | |
| 3. Organization: Name | | |
| Address | | |
| City | State | Zip |
| 4. Speaking for Organization | | Y N |
| 5. Direct experience with VTS | | Y N |
| If yes, Daily Weekly Monthly | | |
| 6. Indirect Experience with VTS | | Y N |
| 7. Direct experience with VTS | | Y N |
| 8. Visited the VTC | | Y N |
| 9. What are the better features/services of the VTRS? | | |
| 10. What are the poorer features/services of the VTS? | | |
| 11. How can the operation of the VTS be improved? | | |
| 12. On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you rate the contribution
that the SFVTS makes to "vessel safety"? | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 13. On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you rate the contribution
that the SFVTS makes to "traffic facilitation"? | | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 |
| 14. Should the SFVTS be operated by an organization other
than the USCG? No-Why? If Yes-Who? and Why? | | |
| 15. Do all your vessels participate in the SFVTS? | | Y N |
| Should all vessels participate in the SFVTS? | | Y N |
| 16. Is the voluntary SFVTS working? | | Y N |
| 17. Should the VTS be "self supporting" by the
collection of "fees for service"? | | Y N |
| If so, to what Degree? Comments: | | |
| 18. Should the SFVTS be abolished? | | Y N |

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE - SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA
IMMEDIATE USER OF THE SFVTS

1.0 Background

- 1.1 What is your position?
- 1.2 What is your experience?
- 1.3 How frequently do you participate in the VTS system?
If yes, Daily Weekly . Monthly
- 1.4 Do you have experience with other ports? Y N
Other VTS systems?
- 1.5 Have you visited the SFVTS?

2.0 Communications

- 2.1 On a scale of 1-7 (1 totally unsatisfactory, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 neutral, 7 excellent) rate the information
provided in SFVTS advisories.
- 2.2 Which information do you find useful and/or
most important?
- 2.3 Which information do you think are not very
useful and/or important?
- 2.4 What problems have you had in receiving these
information recently—that is, in the past six
months or so?

2.5 Ask about following, if not mentioned

- 2.5.1 ...about the vessels and their location in the waterway?
- 2.5.2 ...about the characteristics of the waterway?
- 2.5.3 ...about the environment?
- 2.5.4 ...Information from the VTC regarding
accidents and regulations?
- 2.6 On a scale of 1-7, how would you rate the way VTS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
provides you with information? Is the information
provided clearly, completely, courteously, professionally?

3.0 Traffic Management

- 3.1 On a scale of 1-7 how would you rate the way VTS manages traffic? For example, routes deep draft vessels, arranges passings, and allows or recommends exceptions to the TSS for reasons of safety?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4.0 Mandatory vs voluntary SFVTS

- 4.1 Are satisfied with current SFVTS regulations? (Yes)(no) Why?
4.2 What would a mandatory system mean to you?
4.3 Are you for or against the system becoming mandatory?
4.4 Do you have any problems with other mariners in the area served by the SFVTS?

5.0 Watchstander Competence

- 5.1 On a scale of 1-7 how would you rate watchstander competence?
5.2 On a scale of 1-7 how well do you think the VTS is working?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you rate the contribution that the VTS makes to vessel safety?
7. On a scale of 1 to 7, how would you rate the contribution that the VTS makes to traffic facilitation?
8. Should the SFVTS be run by an organization other than the USCG? If No - Why? If Yes - Who and Why?
9. Should the SFVTS be abolished? Why Yes/No?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Y N

Y N

APPENDIX B
INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
ON SFVTS

INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED ON SFVTS

American President Lines
1950 Franklin Street
Oakland, CA 94612 (415) 271-8384

Captain Carl M. Larkin, Marine Superintendent
Captain Delbert R. Coppock
Captain Charles E. Gedney
Captain R. Jewett
First Officer James C. Dykes

Chevron Shipping Company
555 Market Street
San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 894-4251

W. F. Schill, Manager, U. S. Fleet Division
Captain Gary R. Roberts, Marine Superintendent
Thomas S. Wyman, Manager, Maritime Relations
Captain Arlie D. Burton
Captain Frederick G. Jones
Captain Harry H. Parnell

General Steamship Corporation
400 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 772-9770

J. J. Greene, Senior Vice President

Pacific Merchant Shipping Association
635 Sacramento Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 986-7900

Michael M. Murphy, President

Crowley Maritime Corporation
One Market Plaza
San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 546-2306

Stan Putzke, Director of Marine Operations
Howard S. Placchi, Coordinator, Special Projects
T. F. Mercer, Manager, Marine Operations, Northern California
Captain James E. Jensen
Captain Antone F. Karczinski
Captain Paul Milliken
Captain Robert Richards

Red and White Fleet
Pier 41, Fisherman's Wharf
San Francisco, CA 94133 (415) 546-2847

Shirley J. Kohlwes, Manager, Marine Operations
Captain Edward A. Cerny
Captain William H. Colagross
Captain Edward L. King
Captain Robert J. Kronberg
Captain Frank Simmons
Captain William A. Thau

Western Tug & Barge Co.
Pier 9, Embarcadero
P. O. Box 7953
San Francisco, CA 94119 (415) 285-9111

Rees B. Williams, Jr., Vice President
Captain Barney Edwards
Captain Jack L. Speckels

Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Region
303 World Trade Center
San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 982-7788

Captain William V. Figari, President
Robert H. Langner, Executive Director
Len Silva, Operations Manager

California Inland Pilots Association
Pier 9, Embarcadero
San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 421-5678

Captain Jack Going, Vice President
Captain Carl E. Bowler
Captain Ron Charlesworth
Captain Stanford W. Slough

San Francisco Bar Pilots
Pier 7, Embarcadero
San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 362-5436

Captain Arthur J. Thomas, President
Captain Edgar S. Carlson
Captain John P. Egga
Captain William W. Meyer
Captain James S. Nolan
Joseph A. Zygaj, Operator, Pilot Boat

Pacific Inter Club Yacht Association
251 Kearny Street
San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 989-6352

Bruce Block, Secretary

The Farallon Island Patrol
c/o The Oceanic Society
Fort Mason Center
San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 332-0268

Charles Merrill, Coordinator

The Oceanic Society
Fort Mason Center
San Francisco, CA 94123 (415) 441-1104

Michael J. Herz, Ph.D., Executive Vice President

Point Reyes Bird Observatory
4990 Shoreline Highway
Stinson Beach, CA 94970 (415) 868-1221

Burr Heneman, Executive Director

Sierra Club
530 Bush Street
San Francisco, CA 94108 (415) 981-8634

John Holtzclaw, Conservation Office

U. S. Navy
U. S. Naval Station Treasure Island
Treasure Island
San Francisco, CA 94130 (415) 765-6114

CAPT A. M. Osborne, Commanding Officer
CDR M. D. Seiders, JAG
LT William T. Purcell, Port Service Officer
Captain Daniel J. Darrach, Marine Pilot (Civil Service)

U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office
Bldg #14, Government Island
Alameda, CA 94501 (415) 437-3073

CDR J. M. Jacobs, Planning/Military Readiness
CDR J. J. McCartin, Chief, Investigations Department

U. S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service
Yerba Buena Island
San Francisco, CA 94130 (415) 556-2760

CDR Alvin Cattalini, Commanding Officer
LCDR David Desiderio, Executive Officer
LT Thomas Pray, Watch Officer
LT Albert R. Stiles, Watch Officer
LT Thomas A. Wenzel, Watch Officer

APPENDIX C
SFVTS TRAFFIC SUMMARY
FY79 / FY80

1. COMMERCIAL VESSELS (ALL TYPES)
2. EXPLOSIVE LADEN (HAZMAT) VESSELS
3. U.S. NAVY (EXCEPT SUBS)
4. U.S. COAST GUARD
5. ALL SUBMARINES
6. ALL NON- U.S. NAVAL VESSELS
7. TUGS WITHOUT TOW
8. TUGS WITH TOW
9. DEEP DRAFT VESSELS
10. PASSENGER FERRIES
11. NON-CHANNEL 13 VESSELS
12. DREDGES
13. TANKERS
14. TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED BY SFVTS

TABLE I
COMMERCIAL VESSELS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	729	711	775	587
NOVEMBER	634	696	644	595
DECEMBER	645	731	665	602
JANUARY	678	720	679	519
FEBRUARY	548	575	563	478
MARCH	451	689	629	521
APRIL	652	607	567	506
MAY	672	678	566	562
JUNE	661	663	648	581
JULY	678	812	572	573
AUGUST	721	727	610	657
SEPTEMBER	638	547	573	510
TOTAL	7707	8156	7491	6691

TABLE 2
EXPLOSIVE LADEN (HAZMAT) VESSELS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	3	2	2	11
NOVEMBER	4	1	8	13
DECEMBER	-	5	9	4
JANUARY	1	4	7	6
FEBRUARY	4	4	-	3
MARCH	5	-	7	12
APRIL	-	3	4	22
MAY	9	-	12	9
JUNE	3	6	9	4
JULY	1	4	11	3
AUGUST	2	5	7	8
SEPTEMBER	10	13	8	6
TOTAL	42	47	84	101

TABLE 3
U.S. NAVY (EXCEPT SUBS)

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	55	49	46	81
NOVEMBER	45	67	59	64
DECEMBER	59	27	57	59
JANUARYZ	60	48	35	54
FEBRUARY	52	36	62	62
MARCH	57	48	67	75
APRIL	54	48	79	73
MAY	64	61	81	87
JUNE	66	52	95	89
JULY	75	45	69	72
AUGUST	62	85	80	102
SEPTEMBER	54	89	75	30
TOTAL	703	655	805	846

TABLE 4
U.S. COAST GUARD

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	65	38	47	413
NOVEMBER	51	62	182	346
DECEMBER	40	46	313	371
JANUARY	60	86	289	464
FEBRURY	53	65	244	404
MARCH	76	65	318	447
APRIL	63	67	339	393
MAY	58	86	375	432
JUNE	73	53	397	211
JULY	46	70	334	265
AUGUST	63	49	370	340
SEPTEMBER	62	90	479	339
TOTAL	710	777	3687	4425

TABLE 5
SUBMARINES

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	9	9	6	6
NOVEMBER	1	1	4	9
DECEMBER	2	---	2	9
JANUARY	5	1	12	8
FEBRUARY	1	12	---	6
MARCH	10	5	5	7
APRIL	---	13	16	6
MAY	3	9	12	2
JUNE	10	18	10	17
JULY	4	7	6	8
AUGUST	3	1	13	7
SEPTEMBER	5	5	13	13
TOTAL	53	81	99	98

TABLE 6
FOREIGN NAVY

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	23	2	---	9
NOVEMBER	---	14	4	2
DECEMBER	---	6	---	---
JANUARY	---	---	---	---
FEBRUARY	6	1	6	---
MARCH	4	---	---	---
APRIL	4	12	---	---
MAY	3	2	3	---
JUNE	6	10	6	---
JULY	---	---	---	2
AUGUST	7	---	---	---
SEPTEMBER	---	5	2	---
TOTAL	53	52	21	13

TABLE 7
TUGS WITHOUT TOWS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	460	415	358	593
NOVEMBER	549	372	424	390
DECEMBER	583	394	422	375
JANUARY	552	488	414	377
FEBRUARY	456	358	393	349
MARCH	613	310	390	429
APRIL	516	256	370	424
MAY	435	303	381	356
JUNE	360	272	412	309
JULY	352	323	477	359
AUGUST	384	341	460	403
SEPTEMBER	342	321	431	406
TOTAL	5602	4152	4932	4770

TABLE 8
TUGS WITH TOWS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	1262	993	1259	1460
NOVEMBER	1129	1119	1205	914
DECEMBER	1390	955	1059	1092
JANUARY	1156	1022	1330	1105
FEBRUARY	1982	856	1677	974
MARCH	1124	1015	1748	1066
APRIL	1264	981	1442	1156
MAY	1090	1091	1216	1417
JUNE	1147	1303	1168	1546
JULY	1015	1081	1262	1511
AUGUST	1143	1338	1351	2031
SEPTEMBER	1059	1178	1333	2297
TOTAL	14761	12932	16050	16569

TABLE 9
DEEP DRAFT VESSELS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	10	19	14	12
NOVEMBER	17	15	9	14
DECEMBER	15	16	16	11
JANUARY	10	19	12	10
FEBRUARY	24	17	15	8
MARCH	14	17	12	11
APRIL	10	18	11	8
MAY	17	9	13	12
JUNE	7	16	16	12
JULY	15	15	12	7
AUGUST	17	17	15	7
SEPTEMBER	12	18	16	9
TOTAL	158	196	161	131

TABLE 10
PASSENGER FERRIES

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	2141	2000	2459	2126
NOVEMBER	1833	2037	1582	1624
DECEMBER	2324	2108	2526	1769
JANUARY	2086	1803	1987	1810
FEBRUARY	1868	1707	1676	1515
MARCH	2347	1806	1931	1559
APRIL	2563	2061	2119	1652
MAY	2537	2009	2216	1710
JUNE	2692	2364	2276	2279
JULY	2448	2523	2595	2277
AUGUST	2169	2380	2581	2540
SEPTEMBER	1696	2391	2092	2290
TOTAL	26704	25189	26040	23151

TABLE 11
NON-CHANNEL 13 VESSELS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER		-----	90	188
NOVEMBER		65	124	100
DECEMBER		89	317	147
JANUARY		139	419	180
FEBRUARY		80	100	125
MARCH		108	72	125
APRIL		103	77	216
MAY		93	88	148
JUNE		137	151	253
JULY		73	105	125
AUGUST		97	108	163
SEPTEMBER		63	120	128
TOTAL		1047*	1771	1898

* ONLY 11 MONTH TALLY

TABLE 12

DREDGES

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	---	---	---	114
NOVEMBER	---	167	395	678
DECEMBER	642	595	470	706
JANUARY	695	944	419	784
FEBRUARY	542	278	227	612
MARCH	266	292	31	307
APRIL	1	268	134	---
MAY	2	280	---	300
JUNE	---	233	---	1
JULY	3	272	---	5
AUGUST	---	293	---	93
SEPTEMBER	---	231	---	11
TOTAL	2151	3853	1676	3611

TABLE 13

TANKERS

MONTH	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
OCTOBER	304	288	335	272
NOVEMBER	272	269	299	256
DECEMBER	304	258	284	255
JANUARY	275	302	918	237
FEBRUARY	257	315	271	229
MARCH	330	292	267	224
APRIL	247	268	288	199
MAY	279	280	234	300
JUNE	263	233	302	266
JULY	292	272	324	293
AUGUST	278	293	315	228
SEPTEMBER	270	231	312	253
TOTAL	3371	3301	4149	3012

TABLE 14
TOTAL TRAFFIC HANDLED BY SFVTS

VESSEL DESIGNATION	FISCAL YEAR			
	FY79	FY80	FY81	FY82
COMMERCIAL VESSELS (ALL TYPES)	7707	8156	7491	6691
EXPLOSIVE LADEN (HAZMAT) VESSELS	42	47	84	101
U.S. NAVY (EXCEPT SUBS)	703	655	805	846
U.S. COAST GUARD	710	777	3687	4425
ALL SUBMARINES	53	81	99	98
ALL NON-U.S. NAVAL VESSELS	53	52	21	14
TUGS WITHOUT TOW	5602	4152	4932	4770
TUGS WITH TOW	14761	12932	16050	16569
DEEP DRAFT VESSELS	158	196	161	131
PASSENGER FERRIES	26704	25189	26949	23151
NON-CHANNEL 13 VESSELS	---	1047	1771	1898
DREDGES	2151	3853	1676	3611
TANKERS	3371	3301	4149	3012
TOTAL	62015	60438	66966	65317

APPENDIX D
COALITION TO SAVE VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE
AND
HARBOR SAFETY COMMUNITIES
MARINE EXCHANGE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO REGION

COALITION TO SAVE VTS

Marine Exchange of the San Francisco Bay Region

Pacific Merchant Shipping Association

Matson Navigation Company Inc.
American President Lines
Crowley Maritime Corp.
United States Lines
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.
Sea-Land Service Inc.
Johnson-Scanstar

Foreign Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast

Barber Blue Sea Line
Blue Star Line, Inc.
Canadian Westfal-Larsen Co.
C.N. Lloyd Brasileiro
Columbus Line
Compania Peruana de Vapores
d'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific Line
East Asiatic Company, Inc.
Empress Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A.
Evergreen Line
Evergreen Marine corp.
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana
French Line
Hanjin Container Line
Hapag-Lloyd AG
Hoegh Lines
Hoeg-Ugland Auto Liners
Hong Kong Island Line
Italian Line
Japan Line, Ltd.
Johnson Line
Karlander Kangaroo Line
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.
Knutsen Line
Korea Marine Transport Co.
Korea Shipping Corporation
Maersk Line
Maritime Co. of the Philippines, Ltd.
Mitsui-O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.
NYK Line
Nedlloyd

Neptune Orient Line
Orient Overseas Line
Pacific Australia Direct Line
Pacific Islands Transport Line
Pacific Micronesia & Orient Line
Philippine President Lines, Inc.
Polynesia Line
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd.
Shipping Corporation of India, Ltd.
Showa Shipping Co., Ltd.
Star Shipping A/S
Taian Navigation Co., Ltd.
Toko Line
United Yugoslav Line
Yangming Line
Zim Israel Navigation Co, Ltd.

California Inland Pilots Association
San Francisco Bar Pilots
Port of San Francisco
Port of Oakland
Pacific Interclub Yacht Racing Association
San Francisco Sailing Association
Exxon Corporation
Mobil Oil Corporation
Shell Oil Company
Standard Oil Co. of California
Standard Oil Co. of Ohio
Union Oil Company
Maritime Operations Research
General Steamship Corporation
Service Marine Company
Phil Steinberg Associates
Western Tug and Barge

ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING THE COALITION

California State Senate Joint Resolution
San Francisco Board of Supervisors Resolution
City of Alameda Resolution
California Regional Water Quality Control Board
Sausalito Environmental Action
The Oceanic Society
Whale Center
Point Reyes Bird Observatory
People for a Golden Gate National Recreational Area
The Sierra Club
The Council of American Master Mariners Inc.
California State Board of Pilot Commissioners for the
Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo and Suisan

Plus a substantial number of letters from individuals and
companies in the Greater Bay Area.

MARINE EXCHANGE
OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION
HARBOR SAFETY COMMITTEE MEETING
Friday, January 29, 1982

Dave Adams - Port of Oakland
John Alper - Service Marine
Bruce Block - Pacific Inter Club Yachting Assoc.
CMDR G.H. Brown, III - Port Safety Office, USCG
Capt. John Denham - Maritime Consultant, Pilot
Capt. C.B. Glass - Marine Safety Division, USCG
John Greene - Western Steamship Service (Treasurer,
Marine Exchange)
Capt. Seth Hargrave - Exxon Co., U.S.A.
Larry Harris - Yacht Racing Association
CMDR Tim Johnson ^a - Aids to Navigation, USCG
Mark Kasanin - McCutche, Doyle, Brown & Enersen (Marine
Exchange Counsel)
Bob Langer - Executive Director, Marine Exchange
Capt. Carl Larkin - American President Lines (Chairman,
Harbor Safety Committee)
Jim Macaulay - Crowley Maritime
Ted Matsler - U.S. Navigation
Cholly Mercer - Crowley Maritime
Capt. William Meyer - S.F. Bar Pilots
Mike Murphy - P.M.S.A.
Capt. Bob Murry - Matson Navigation
Ted Rausch - Ted L. Rausch Co., Inc. (President, Marine Exchange)
Capt. G.R. Roberts - Chevron Shipping
CMDR James Shanower ^b - Commanding Officer, USCG SFVTS
Leonard Silva - Operations Manager, Marine Exchange
VADM James Stewart ^c - 12th District & Pacific Area Commander,
USCG

John Verheul - Port of Oakland
Wayne Wheeler - U.S. Coast Guard
Capt. George Wallace - California Inland Pilots
Hal Williams - Lykes Bros.
Rees Williams - Western Tug & Barge
James C. Wolfe - S.F. District, Corps of Engineers

^a Relieved by: LCDR J.J. Fontana

^b Relieved by: CDR Alvin Cattalini

^c Relieved by: VADM C.E. Larkin

APPENDIX E

SOME NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS ON THE

SAN FRANCISCO VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE

The Appendix contains a sample of clippings concerning the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service. These clippings are from newspapers in the San Francisco Bay Area and indicates the importance that the media and through them the public attaches to the continuing operation of the San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service atop Yerba Buena Island.

San Francisco Chronicle

THE VOICE OF THE WEST

Founded 1865 by Charles and M.H. de Young

George T. Cameron, Publisher 1925-35

Charles de Young Thieriot, Publisher 1935-77

Richard T. Thieriot
Editor and Publisher

William German
Managing Editor

Templeton Poole
Editorial Page Editor

JAN 25 1982

EDITORIALS

Keep Stockman's Hands Off

IT IS INCONSISTENT, if not downright contradictory, for the administration, dedicated to defense readiness, to impose severe cutbacks on the Coast Guard, one of the most cost-effective and useful of the nation's uniformed services. The decision is objectionable and should be reversed.

Among local Coast Guard facilities which are to be closed are the recruit training station at Government Island at Alameda and the San Francisco Bay Vessel Traffic Service at Yerba Buena Island. We say goodbye to the boot camp with regret, but the young sailors can be trained just as well, we suppose, at Cape May, New Jersey, the service's other basic training installation. We wonder at the wisdom of this decision of budgetmaster David Stockman, however, for it is logical to train seamen on both coasts from which vessels sail.

Consolidation, the argument used for the recruit move, is not available to justify closure of the Vessel Traffic Service, however.

THE VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE is of importance in several ways when defense is defined in its broadest sense. It was established a decade ago to provide radar surveillance of the bay after a collision of two tankers caused an oil spill disaster. No such incidents have occurred since the service began.

San Francisco Bay is a major shipping point not only for oil tankers but also for ammunition, conventional and nuclear. Nuclear-powered vessels also use the bay. In March of 1969, the freighter American Producer, attempting to avoid a collision, slammed into Pier 27 below Telegraph Hill with such force that 65 feet of its bow was torn away. The ship carried 7000 tons of rockets and fragmentation bombs and explosion and destruction of much of the city and death of many inhabitants was in the balance for more than three hours as efforts were made to free the vessel. One such brush with calamity was enough; no such dangerous situation has happened since the Vessel Traffic Service has been in operation.

The federal government is responsible for weapons' movements and movements of nuclear-powered vessels in and out of the bay, an area of large population concentrations. It must maintain the Vessel Traffic Service as an insurance policy for Bay Area residents in their interests as well as its own.

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Editorial Comment

SOME HAVE THEORIZED that Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt retains his position in the Reagan cabinet because he is a lightning rod, drawing away criticism which might otherwise be directed at the president. Some say he is there because he is the president's man, carrying out his job in harmony with the desire and philosophy of the president. And, some also say, the good guy president simply does not replace those who have given him loyalty no matter how much embarrassment they cause.

We will state no preference among contended theories but will report verifiable fact. James G. Watt is bringing about a significant change in American politics. He has transformed hundreds of thousands of formerly placid Americans into political activists.

Almost single-handedly, Secretary Watt has caused formation of environmental political action committees, an entirely new development in national politics. They spent hundreds of thousands of dollars last November to elect candidates who will oppose the secretary's dreams of opening up wilderness and coastline to resource exploitation.

Some of the secretary's recent and typically irresponsible statements show why he has successfully created so many enemies. American Indian reservations, he says, show the failure of socialism, a statement that gives woefully little regard to the tragic history of the white man's relationship with the native people who were in his way. And, the secretary says, conservation activists want control of the total society in the same that society was controlled in Nazi Germany and is controlled in the Soviet Union. The analogy is odious, misplaced and convincing evidence of poor judgment.

Such statements of Watt do fuel a growing fire, however. And one statistic illustrates what has been taking place. In the first 88 years of its existence before 1980, the Sierra Club, which has its headquarters in this city, attained a membership of 180,693. In two years of the Reagan administration with Watt as its Interior secretary, the Sierra Club has reached a membership of 336,561, almost double its previous non-Watt membership.

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San Francisco Chronicle

Richard T. Thieriot, Editor and Publisher
Charles de Young Thieriot, Publisher 1955-77
George T. Cameron, Publisher 1925-55
Founded 1865 by Charles and M.M. de Young

Friends of the Earth, which was founded in San Francisco by former Sierra Club executive David Browder, has jumped from a late 1979 membership of 23,914 to 32,001 and has seen its gift donors climb from 4629 to 13,251.

The Wilderness Society of Washington, D. C., has experienced membership growth of more than 30 percent to a new high of more than 65,000 members.

The greatly increased membership brought about, last fall, the first serious efforts of the conservation movement to play a direct political role. Sierra Club executive director Michael McCloskey says that the 1982 elections "marked a historical turning of the environmental movement to electoral politics."

"From the standing start, environmental activists became one of the nation's three or four most significant sources of campaign support — along with labor unions, women's groups and senior citizens," McCloskey says. "(The) Sierra Club . . . involved itself in national electoral politics for the first time since its founding 90 years ago.

"The results were remarkably good: The Sierra Club made endorsements in 153 House races; 121 of its endorsed candidates won. In the Senate, 11 of 15 Sierra Club-backed candidates won, and 9 of 10 gubernatorial candidates won. The overall success rate was about 80 percent . . . Four other environmental PACs were active also and enjoyed similar success."

"Environmentalists have been galvanized into becoming a new force in American electoral politics as they seek to defend values which one would have thought would never have been under siege," McCloskey says.

★ ★ ★

WATT IS POLARIZING and politicizing what should not be a matter of bipartisanship. The issue of stewardship of federal lands and coastal waters is not the sort of issue for sharp splits between liberals and conservatives.

President Reagan has recently witnessed the departure of Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis, one of the most effective administrators of his initial cabinet, and of Secretary of Health and Human Services Richard Schweiker, highly-regarded despite some controversies. He is seeing assets depart. It is assuredly time that he should be seeing liabilities depart with Watt the first nominee.

Opinion / San Francisco Examiner

SOS: Coast Guard in trouble

WHAT IF they gave a disaster and nobody came — to the rescue, that is?

The latest swing of the federal budgetary ax would cut \$46 million from the \$1.4 billion that the Coast Guard says it needs to operate next year. Deep-sixed would be the Vessel Traffic Safety station at Yerba Buena Island on the usually fog-shrouded Bay, the recruit training station at Government Island in Alameda, 11 of the Guard's 75 cutters (including two that are based on the West Coast), the air station and three search and rescue support teams in Southern California, the search and rescue station at boat-bedecked Lake Tahoe, and a host of facilities across the country and in Puerto Rico.

Stranger "economies" have been proposed, but we are hard put to name them.

The Vessel Traffic Safety station, for example — something akin to air traffic control for the Bay waters — handles 40,000 to 60,000 ships per year, from civilian pleasure craft to oil-laden tankers, ammunition-bearing freighters and nuclear-powered ships and submarines.

There have been no major mishaps in the Bay since the station and its sophisticated machinery and highly trained personnel were established in 1973. On the other hand, during the Vietnam War a freighter laden with bombs and rockets slammed into Pier 27 at the foot of Telegraph Hill, ripping 85 feet from its bow and imperiling The City for hours.

Equally shortsighted are plans to close the boot camp on Government Island and to move everyone to Cape May, N.J. The Pacific is home

to the United States' largest overseas trading partner, Japan. If anything, efforts should be made to enlarge the West Coast facility since trade with Japan is increasing, not diminishing.

The rebuttals are inexhaustive: The "Pacific" is the most misnamed ocean in the world. Its storms are fierce and unpredictable. Yet Coast Guard cutters berthed at Eureka and San Pedro would be decommissioned.

The Coast Guard's responsibilities, in general, have been increased sharply in the last few years. It now keeps a steady watch on the Windward Passage off Haiti, searching for refugee ships at an estimated cost of \$1 million a month; patrols against smugglers and spy ships have been stepped up; and the always potentially volatile disagreements with other nations over fishing rights have taxed the Guard further.

The Coast Guard is credited with saving nearly 7,000 lives in 1980, and with assisting almost 195,000 people. Whose lives will be forfeited should the cuts come about?

To quote Rep. James Oberstar of Minnesota, the Land of 10,000 Lakes, "If the president is interested in maximizing the security of the American people, he would spend more on search and rescue, vessel safety and antidrug smuggling operations, and build one less B-1 bomber."

If anything should be set adrift, it is the shortsighted suggestion to scuttle some of the Coast Guard's most fundamental jobs — an idea, we note, that emanated in the landlocked capital.

San Jose Mercury

Editorials

Thursday, February 4, 1982

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Risky cuts for Coast Guard

THE Reagan administration could be risking untold lives and property damage if it insists that the Coast Guard swallow budget cuts estimated to range between \$43 million and \$60 million this fiscal year.

It's one thing to close the smaller recruiting offices, lay up a few over-age cutters and buoy tenders, consolidate recruit training at Cape May, N.J. and move the Coast Guard Band from New London, Conn. to Washington, D.C. All that may contribute to a leaner, more efficient service.

It's quite another thing to close 15 search-and-rescue stations in 11 states (one in California, at Klamath), cut the budgets of 16 other stations, including the one at Lake Tahoe, and get out of the business of monitoring ship traffic in three of the nation's busiest harbors, New York, New Orleans and San Francisco.

That's worse than being penny-wise and pound-foolish. The whole concept of playing acceptable-risk games with human lives is repugnant, and it's financially dubious as well, at least as far as the vessel traffic service centers in New York, New Orleans and San Francisco are concerned. It could cost Americans, as consumers and taxpayers, much more not to have them operating than the Coast Guard may save by shutting them down.

The San Francisco Vessel Traffic Service on Yerba Buena Island illustrates the point. Seven officers and 27 enlisted men operate the station's radar and radio, tracking an estimated 200 ship movements a day, or about 60,000 a year. When heavy fog settles over the 50 navigable miles of San Francisco Bay, the VTS can be a lifesaver. In fact, the presumption must be that it has saved lives; in its nine years of operation, there has not been a major maritime collision in the bay.

Not coincidentally, Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 — which established the nationwide VTS system — after a pair of 17,000-ton tankers, the Arizona Standard and the Oregon Standard, collided under the Golden Gate Bridge in January 1971. They were traveling in dense fog, and neither

was in communication with an embryonic experimental VTS then being operated by the San Francisco Maritime Exchange.

An estimated 1.9 million gallons of fuel oozed out of the Oregon Standard, spreading an oil slick from Point Reyes, 30 miles north of the Golden Gate, to Pacifica, 20 miles south of it. The slick killed thousands of sea birds and generated lawsuits totaling more than \$3 billion against Standard Oil Co. of California, the owner of both vessels.

A year after this maritime disaster Congress passed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and a year after that the Coast Guard put its San Francisco VTS into operation. Today, it costs about \$600,000 a year to operate, \$500,000 of that in Coast Guard salaries.

That seems a small price to pay for the ability to avoid disaster — and with 60,000 ship movements on the bay each year, there is a potential for disaster every time fog or rain reduces visibility significantly. Not surprisingly, the San Francisco Bar Pilots Association and the California Inland Pilots Association both oppose the Coast Guard's plan to shut down the San Francisco VTS.

We think they have good cause, and we hope the Coast Guard will reconsider. If it doesn't, Congress should intervene, either to suggest alternative budget reductions or to provide more money for the Coast Guard.

The budget reductions currently planned would literally decimate this service. They would pare an estimated 3,400 officers and men, or 10 percent of the Coast Guard, from the active duty roster.

At a minimum, Congress should ask itself how the Coast Guard can be expected to apprehend drug smugglers, police the nation's fisheries, rescue the drowning, monitor port traffic, certify the seaworthiness of vessels visiting American ports, maintain a sophisticated system of aids to navigation — and more — and accept a 10 percent cut in personnel at the same time.

Clearly, if these budget reductions stand, something will have to give, and we fear it will be the safety of Americans on the nation's waterways.

Opinion/ *San Francisco Examiner*

Help is on the way

SEN. ALAN Cranston has come to the Coast Guard's rescue with a bill that would restore \$46 million in funds that were cut from the Guard's \$1.4 billion request for the next fiscal year. Restoring the funds would preserve, among other things, the all-important Vessel Traffic Safety station on Yerba Buena Island, which handles 40,000 to 60,000 ships per year in the often fog-blanketed Bay; Coast Guard cutters berthed at Eureka and San Pedro, which are used for rescue and intercepting smugglers; and rescue aircraft based at Los Angeles International Airport.


The money was requested by the Reagan administration, but was removed in an across-the-board congressional budget-cutting spree.

It would be shortsighted, to say the least, to cut the Coast Guard's funds and to scuttle these obviously vital services — particularly at a time when the Guard is increasing its patrols for refugees and smugglers, and interceding in fishing rights disputes with other nations.

Congress should move full-speed-ahead to restore the funds.

S.F. Progress Wed., February 17, 1982

=Editorials & Commentary=



SOS: A call for help around the Bay



The United States Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) which is located on Yerba Buena Island is scheduled to close its doors and cease operations in less than 30 days—March 15.

Unless something is done to change the course of the government action, San Francisco Bay will lose one of its most vital safety services to commercial, private and pleasure craft plying our inland waters.

The funding for the VTS is being cut off to reduce federal spending (the annual VTS budget is \$700,000).

In a federal budget of \$ billions, the \$700,000 seems a paltry amount, and yet a heavy price to pay for the potential loss of this vital safety service.

We are pleased to offer our wholehearted support of the action of February 9th announced by Captain Carl Larkin of American President Lines to form a Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service. The purpose is to put pressure to bear on the federal government through public opinion to reinstate VTS funding.

Efforts will be made by the coalition to meet with Department of Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis at the earliest possible date to discuss this important subject and to reflect the views of Bay Area residents, civic business and government leaders.

The Coast Guard's VTS has effectively served San Francisco Bay since 1973, acting as a safety traffic coordinator of tens of thousands of vessels. In 1981, for example, the VTS safely handled more than 65,000 vessel movements under all types of weather conditions.

The service to tankers, freighters, passenger ferries, recreational craft and fishing fleet vessels provides a radar safety advisory in a harbor of unique climate and geography.

The safety factor alone, as Captain Larkin pointed out in terms of lives and property more than justifies the \$700,000 cost of operation annually.

It is highly significant to note that there has not been a single major mishap in San Francisco Bay since the station, with its highly trained Coast Guard personnel, was established in 1973.

We believe the federal government action to scuttle the VTS is shortsighted economics and fraught with serious potential dangers for the highly populated Bay Area.

We urge Progress readers, their friends and neighbors to join with us in support of the Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service. You may write to the following address:

Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service, 635 Sacramento Street, Suite 300, P. O. Box 7861, San Francisco, CA 94120.

Or, you may write direct to: *Honorable Drew Lewis, Secretary, Department of Transportation, 400 7th Street, Washington, D. C. 20590.*

As we join together in this important effort, your voice **CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE.**

Time is a very critical factor if we are to save the Coast Guard VTS.

We urge you to make your comments known today.

Independent Journal

Robert J. Well, *Publisher*
Norwin S. Yoffie, *President*

David M. Smith
Executive Editor

Roy L. Barron
Editor

Bay vessel safety service must stay

A serious and concerted effort is being made to save Coast Guard installations and functions in California, but of particular importance is keeping the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service on San Francisco Bay.

TOWARD that end the best collective voice is the Coalition to Save Vessel Traffic Service composed of representatives of barge, tanking operations, water transportation firms and recreational boaters. The coalition says the federal budget ax will end what it calls "a major navigation safety system" for the bay.

U.S. Sen. Alan Cranston has introduced legislation supporting the saving of much of the Coast Guard effort. State Sen. Milton Marks has introduced a joint resolution asking the U.S. Department of Transportation to save the VTS.

IF CONGRESS follows through with its budget plan, this vital safety service will be scuttled along with the planned reduction of coastal

rescue services and the closure of the boot camp on Government Island in San Francisco Bay.

But it is the VTS that is vital to the everyday life of the Bay Area, and in no small measure, to the thousands of Marinites who ply bay waters in recreational craft.

THE SYSTEM was started in 1973 after a disastrous tanker collision, and there has been no major mishaps since then. This has been accomplished with the Coast Guard coordination of more than 65,000 vessel movements a year. In asking for restoration of Coast Guard funds, the coalition specifically seeks restoration of \$700,000.

That amount is included in a Coast Guard budget rescue of \$46 million proposed by Cranston. The president requested the full amount but congressional budget cutters deleted it.

Congress must act quickly to restore the Vessel Traffic Service fund and other monies pertaining to safety and rescue.

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Combined effort

Editor, *SS*

Congratulations and thanks to Progress Publisher Marvin Johnson and others who managed to rescue the Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic Service from budget-cutting disaster.

This system is essential to the safe passage of ships in San Francisco Bay, and its modest cost for a staff of (40) Coast Guardsmen is well justified.

We joined the Progress in the effort to save this valuable system. Now that the Coast Guard has reversed its decision, let us work to make the system a permanent fixture on the Bay.

Dianne Feinstein
Mayor

The Progress is very pleased to have taken a leadership role in this effort, and we extend our appreciation to Mayor Feinstein and all of the readers who responded with messages to Washington. Many voices can make a difference.

— Editor

JUN 18 1982

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Coast Guard Bay monitoring saved

A radar system operated by the U.S. Coast Guard and used to guide ships into the foggy San Francisco Bay has been saved, according to spokesman Ken Freeze.

The Vessel Traffic Service System, which operates out of Yerba Buena Island, has a staff of (40). According to Freeze, it handles an average of 200 vessels a day and approximately 60,000 vessels a year.

It was scheduled to be terminated March 15 as a result of a proposed \$46 million federal cut of the Coast Guard's \$1.4 billion operating budget. Closure of the system was expected to save approximately \$500,000.

Freeze said about a month ago the system was given a 45-day reprieve. Today the Coast Guard office received notice that "the closure would not go into effect at all."

EDITORIALS

The Waterfront Is Looking Up

IN A TIME when we look at sets of statistics which are generally depressing, it is pleasant to turn our attention to the waterfront where, at the moment, things are quite upbeat.

Port Director Edward David has reported to Mayor Dianne Feinstein that port income, for the fiscal year ended June 30, was up 15 percent over that of the preceding year. Revenues increased nine percent to reach \$23.8 million.

The mayor is entitled to say that this represents a great turnaround, for it is the fourth straight year of growth in income and revenue.

AND IT IS apparent that this trend of increased maritime activity in the Port of San Francisco and in the bay generally will continue unless unforeseen events occur. The acquisition of the old Bethlehem Steel shipyards at 21st and Illinois Streets has already resulted in assignment of some \$19 million of work on the Navy supply ship Roanoke to the yard. Todd says that jobs which will aggregate \$60 million have been lined up for the yard.

The Navy has assigned two aircraft carriers to Alameda, some supply ships and two minesweepers to the bay in recent years. Now, the mayor says, it is going to assign a carrier battle group, some 14 combat vessels, to be homeported in San Francisco, an assignment which will mean substantial increase in Navy expenditures in an area it had been neglecting for some years.

Holland America Cruises has designated San Francisco as the American home port for its new and large luxury liner Nieuw Amsterdam, due to arrive next month, and the shipping line of the Peoples Republic of China will also use the Port of San Francisco as a West coast port of call.

AND WE HAVE, or at least many of us have, just watched the initial entry into the bay of the largest American container ship yet built, the new President Lincoln of American President Lines of San Francisco. The \$120-million, 860-foot vessel, the first of three sisters, is part of an \$800 million APL modernization of vessels and facilities.

This all totals up to significant amounts of money which finds its way through the entire economic fabric of the Bay Area. The total was recently calculated for 1981 by consultants retained by the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association. They found that maritime activities of all kinds brought \$2.1 billion into the economy of the nine county area and \$8.2 billion to the economy of California. What is more, the consultants reported that the figure will grow this year even if the rest of the economy is slow. There's gold, it seems, in them thar waves.

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